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Abstract
In a setting that focuses on eﬃcient dynamic hours-workers substitution we show that
contingent worksharing contributes to workers retention during bad business spells and to
sustained hiring during good spells. As a consequence, average employment increases on both
accounts. We also show that worksharing interacts with ﬁring costs in aﬀecting workforce
decisions and determines the sign of the employment impact from an increase in ﬁring restric-
tions.
Jel Classiﬁcation: J23, J63, C61
Keywords: Temporary worksharing, Firing Costs, Stochastic methods
∗ Address: Università Cattoluca del S. Cuore, Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milan. Ph. +39 02 72342669. Mail:
giulio.piccirilli@unicatt.it
11 Introduction
. This paper is concerned with the employment eﬀect of contingent worksharing. For contingent
worksharing we mean those arrangements that point to workers retention during bad business
spells through temporary reductions in working hours as well as wages. Agreements between ﬁrms
and workers representatives on contingent worksharing are frequent in Europe (IRS, 1999). This
is due to a favorable institutional environment which provides means to prop up temporary losses
of income for workers.
We study the employment impact of contingent worksharing in a partial equilibrium cost-
minimisation model. In our setting, the representative ﬁrm operates in an uncertain environment
and faces linear costs from adjusting labour both on the extensive (employees) and on the intensive
margin (hours). The ﬁrst are due to institutional hiring and ﬁring costs, typical of many European
labour markets. The second take the form of costs due to unbalances between actual working hours
and the standard working time determined by institutions. There are overtime premia during spells
of intense activity and payments for idle hours during periods of low production.
We show that, under our set of technical assumptions and in line with other contributions, the
optimal employment policy is characterised by an Ss policy. As long as the intensity of production
leads to unbalances between actual and standard hours that are contained within well deﬁned
boundaries, workforce inaction represents the optimal decision. Conversely, when unbalances move
beyond these boundaries, workforce adjustments take place in order to reset actual hours onto the
boundaries.
Using the optimal Ss policy we perform numerical comparative dynamics and ﬁnd that contin-
gent worksharing makes ﬁrms more reluctant to ﬁre during periods of low production. Interestingly,
we also ﬁnd that worksharing makes ﬁrms more willing to hire during periods of intense produc-
tion so that the impact of worksharing on employment is unambiguously positive. The force that
drives both results is the increase in the net marginal value of employed workforce. Workers be-
come more valuable to the ﬁrm if worksharing sets in when production is low. This contributes to
their retention in bad times and to their recruitment in good times.
We also show that contingent worksharing aﬀects the employment impact following an increase
in ﬁring costs. A well know result in the literature based on dynamic labour demand is that an
increase in ﬁring costs leads to an enlargement of the inaction space. The ﬁrm becomes more
reluctant towards ﬁring as well as toward hiring with an uncertain impact on the average employ-
ment level (Bertola and Bentolila, 1990). This result holds in the present paper too but with the
following additional corollary. Due to worksharing, the impact on hiring and ﬁring decisions is
not symmetric. Reluctance towards ﬁring increases more than reluctance towards hiring with the
consequence that, following an increase in ﬁring costs, average employment tends to increase.
2Models of workforce adjustments have been formulated in several previous works1. None of
these, however, analyses hours-employment decisions with worksharing and in a stochastic setting.
Even if it is not concerned with the hours-employment substitution, the seminal work of Bertola
and Bentolila (1990) represents the main reference for the techniques that have been used in the
present paper. However, the paper contains elements of technical originality as it develops a simple
and intuitive method to handle stochastic integration over discontinuous payoﬀ functions. This
method is inspired by the reading of Harrison (1985) and hinges on the evaluation of stochastic
discount factors similar to Arrow-Debreu securities. To our knowledge, this approach is novel in
the literature of reference.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the setup without contingent
worksharing. In section 3 we introduce worksharing and study its eﬀects through numerical com-
putations. Section 4 oﬀers some conclusive remarks.
2 A problem of workforce management
2.1 Set up
We consider an establishment that produces a non-storable output ﬂow yt by using the following
technology:
yt = y(Lt,ht) = Ltht (1)
Lt represents the mass of employed workers and ht the number of individual hours that are actually
used for production purposes. Thus, by stating equation 1, we make three basic assumptions:
production does not require capital, marginal returns for each labour component are constant
and, related to the latter, workers can be employed for an unbounded number of hours. The
absence of capital is explained by our focus on short term ﬂuctuations which rule out capital
adjustments from the set of available options. Constant marginal returns represent instead an
innocuous simpliﬁcation in the sense that all results can be obtained with a more general technology
of the form yt = Lα
t h
β
t (α,β ≤ 1). Lastly, we are aware that the absence of bounds for the number
of working hours is at odds with an obvious physical constraint and with the assumption of constant
marginal returns. However, we ﬁnd below that in equilibrium hours can not move outside a rather
narrow corridor. This makes redundant any reasonable physical constraint and plausible the above
assumption of constant returns.
The establishment is required to produce an output ﬂow zt which evolves as a (µ,σ)-geometric
Brownian motion. That is, we assume that the ﬁrm that runs the establishment has a limited
power or a limited beneﬁt to smooth demand through price variations. This may be due, for
1See, for instance, Nickell (1986), Hamermesh (1989 and 1990), Bertola and Bentolila (1990) and Nuziata (2003).
3instance, to high menu costs or to price-taking behaviour2.
Non-storability implies yt = zt at all times so that the ﬁrm has to adapt continuously Lt and/or
ht to respond to the output requirement. In line with the literature on workforce adjustment costs,
we assume that to recruit and to dismiss a worker the ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed hiring cost H and
a ﬁxed ﬁring cost F. Hiring costs originate from advertisement, selection and training activities;
ﬁring costs are mainly due to provisions contained in the employment protection legislation.3 To
complete the description of the institutional setting, we use hs and p for the statutory working
time and for the over-time hourly premium and assume that both parameters are exogenous to
the ﬁrm in that they are determined by legal provisions or by some economy-wide union-employers
agreement4. As a consequence of this assumption, when ht is larger than hs, individuals work
overtime and are entitled to perceive a wage premium. By contrast, if ht is lower than hs, the
diﬀerence hs − ht represents the amount of individual idle hours, i.e. hours that must be paid
to the worker even if they are not eﬀectively used in productive activities. This happens when
workers stay at work for hs hours but the tasks they perform could be done in a shorter period of
time, we refer to this case as undertime.5
Finally, with w and r we represent respectively the exogenous hourly wage and the interest rate.
The objective of the manager in charge of the establishment is the minimisation of the expected
discounted stream of costs necessary to produce the ﬂow zt.
2.2 Fixed Workforce
To avoid overtime costs and undertime costs (i.e. payments for idle labour), eﬀective working
time ht should be continuously pegged at the statutory level hs. In turn, continuous pegging
involves continuous workforce changes to adapt production to the output requirement zt. Finally,
continuous workforce changes lead to large ﬁring and hiring costs due to the volatility of zt. In the
next subsection, we show that the optimal employment policy entails workforce inaction and free
variations of ht as long as the latter wanders within a corridor which contains hs. In proximity
of the lower boundary of the corridor undertime prevails so that ﬁring would lead to a reduction
2The assumption that ﬁrms can not smooth demand through prices is common to many other works. See
Galeotti et al. (2005) and papers cited therein, for instance. Marchetti and Nucci (2006) analyse a sample of Italian
manufacturing ﬁrms and show that some ﬁrms use prices while some others use hours to respond to variations in
demand. They interpret the behaviour of the latter as a result of high menu costs.
3With variable hours and, consequently, variable monthly wages, it may seem unwarranted to assume ﬁxed
ﬁring costs. In fact, in many legislations, dismissed workers are entitled to perceive severance payments that are
proportional to their most recent labour income. Yet, as reported in the introduction, in many European countries
wage supplement schemes operate so as to keep workers incomes constant during periods of short hours employment.
This makes severance payments virtually independent from the amount of hours worked under worksharing.
4See OECD (1998) ch.5 for a survey on the size of hs and p across industrialised economies.
5” ... Undertime can take many forms, from hours spent away from the oﬃce on errands to chunks of time spent
at your desk surﬁng the Internet....” Sue Shellenbarger, The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2002
4in undertime costs. The boundary is endogenously determined by a condition which equates the
ﬁring cost F to the expected saving in undertime costs following a dismissal. By contrast, close
to the upper boundary overtime prevails. In this case, the boundary is determined by a condition
which equates the hiring cost H to the expected saving in overtime costs following a recruit.
As a preliminary step to illustrate how to compute these boundaries, in this section we assume
that H and F are so large that the expected saving in undertime and overtime costs is always
smaller than the corresponding ﬁring and hiring cost. That is, the ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to dismiss a worker even if z and h are nil and it does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to recruit a worker
even if z and h grow unbounded. One may also regard this case as if the lower boundary were zero
and the upper boundary inﬁnity.
How large need F and H to be to prevent workforce adjustments in all demand conditions? If
z and h are nil at current time they will be nil at all future times.6 In this case, in the absence of
workforce adjustments and with a workforce of size L, the ﬁrm pays a wage hsw to L unproductive
workers. Thus, the overall discounted wage bill is Lhsw/r. Dismissing the L workers would cost
the ﬁrm FL so that it does not ﬁre any of them if F is larger than hsw/r. On the other hand, if
z grows to inﬁnity so do working hours h under the assumptions of constant marginal returns and
absence of physical constraints. In this case, overtime becomes a permanent state and the ﬁrm
does not hire if H is larger than phsw/r, i.e. if the cost of recruiting an extra worker is larger than
the ensuing discounted saving in overtime costs.





As a consequence of workforce being ﬁxed at some level L, variations in zt are accommodated
only through changes in individual working time ht: ht = zt/L. It follows that actual working
time ht evolves as a (µ,σ)-geometric Brownian motion. Let S(h) represent the shadow value of
workforce when ht is currently at level h. Formally, S(h)dL coincides with the reduction in the
expected discounted ﬂow of undertime/overtime losses if the ﬁrm, contrary to the implication of










g = hswp g = −hsw
6With ﬁxed workforce, both z and h evolve as a geometric brownian motion, i.e. dx = xµdt + xσdW x = z,h.
Thus, dx = 0 if x = 0.
5In this formula, I() represents an indicator which is equal to one when the attached inequality
is true and zero otherwise. g and g represent instead the pay-oﬀ rates from the workforce addition
respectively in the overtime and in the undertime region. Adding dL workers reduces overtime
hours by hs dL and overtime costs by hswp dL in the overtime region, the pay-oﬀ is therefore
positive [g > 0]. By contrast, adding dL workers increases undertime by hs dL and undertime







In this subsection we solve the expected value in 3 and express S(h) in analytical terms. The
jump in the pay-oﬀ at hs, however, rules out the adoption of standard techniques and motivates
the development of a method to handle stochastic integration with discontinuous functions. To
implement this method we ﬁrst need to rewrite S(h) as an integral across future h-states. For this
purpose, let P(￿ h;h,t) represent the probability for ht to be equal or lower than ￿ h given that, at
the current time 0, working hours are equal to h:
P(￿ h;h,t) = prob[ht ≤ ￿ h | h0 = h]
Using P to substitute the expectation operator in 3, we can rewrite S(h) as follows:(formal deriva-




v(h,￿ h)d￿ h + g
￿ ∞
hs





The expression v(h,￿ h) can be interpreted as a state-contingent discount factor. In fact, v(h,￿ h)
represents the value in ”state” h of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one euro per unit of time
dt whenever the process hits ”state” ￿ h. As a consequence, the ﬁrst integral on the RHS of 4 gives
the value in state h of an asset that pays one euro per unit of time dt whenever the process lies
in the undertime region [0,hs). The integral then provides the appropriate metric to assess at the
current state h the contribution of a workforce addition in the undertime region. Analogously,
the second integral on the RHS of 4 gives the appropriate metric to evaluate the addition in the
overtime region.
Since ht evolves as a geometric brownian motion, P is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect
to ￿ h. Equation 5 relates v(h,￿ h) to P￿(￿ h;h,t), which is the derivative of P with respect to ￿ h.
Intuitively, the integral in 5 adds over time the probability for working hours to be equal to ￿ h
multiplied by the appropriate discount factor.
6The upshot of transforming equation 3 in equations 4-5 is that, to compute S(h), one needs
ﬁrst to compute v(h,￿ h). This is done below through lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1
P￿(R￿ h;Rh,t) = P￿(￿ h;h,t)/R for any R > 0 (6)
Proof
The two geometric brownian motions {ht} and {Rht} are spatially homogeneous:
















This ends the proof of lemma 1.￿
Corollary




Equations 5 and 6 imply v(Rh,R￿ h) = v(h,￿ h)/R and, in particular, v(R￿ h,R￿ h) = v(￿ h,￿ h)/R.
Equation 8 obtains from positing R = 1/￿ h.￿
Lemma 2




























Let T(￿ h) represent the time when the process ﬁrstly hits state ￿ h given that at current time 0
it lies in state h . Discount factors v(h,￿ h) and v(￿ h,￿ h) are, by deﬁnition, connected through the
relationship (formal derivation of 11 in the appendix)





A standard result from stochastic calculus (see, for instance, Dixit et al., 1999) is that the expected








when h ≥ ￿ h. Combine
this result with 8 and 11 and obtain 9.
The value of v(1,1) in 10 is pinned down by imposing equality between the cumulative value
of assets v(h,￿ h) and that of a perpetuity that pays one euro per unit of time dt in all states:
￿
￿ h≥0
v(h,￿ h)d￿ h =
￿ ∞
0
e−rtdt = 1/r (12)
This ends the proof of lemma 2.￿
Substitute 9 and 10 in 4 and compute S(h):
S(h) =

   




















￿α2 h ∈ (hs,∞)
(13)
It is straightforward to show that, irrespective of the discontinuity in the payoﬀ function, S(h) is
continuous with a continuous ﬁrst derivative. The sections of S(h) in the overtime and undertime
regions smooth paste at hs in the sense that they both converge to the same value S(hs) with
equal ﬁrst derivatives. The intuition for continuity and smoothness is as follows. The brownian
motion for hours implies that, in proximity of hs - and even during a very small time interval dt -
ht crosses the level hs many times so that its actual position, on the right or the left of hs, is truly
immaterial if one has to assess the value of an extra worker added to workforce.
It is also straightforward to see that the slope of S(h) is always positive in both regions. This
means that the value of an extra worker increases as production and actual working hours increase.












The intuition for results in 14 is simple. As current working time approaches inﬁnity, overtime
holds with certainty at present and in all future periods, thus the per-period reduction in overtime
costs hswp is discounted at the ”certainty” rate r. Analogously, if h → 0, undertime becomes
permanent so that the increase in undertime costs is discounted at rate r.
Results in equation 14 take us back to the parameter restriction 2 stated in subsection 2.2.
If current working time is h, adding a single worker gives a beneﬁt S(h) whereas the cost of the
addition is H. By contrast, ﬁring a single worker entails a cost F and gives a beneﬁt −S(h). It
follows that workforce adjustments do not take place even for asymptotic values of h if
8lim
h→∞
S(h) < H ad lim
h→0
S(h) > −F
The latter replicate condition 2 once one substitutes equation 14.
2.4 Hiring and Firing
Up to this point we have assumed that H and F are so large to discourage workforce adjustments
in all demand conditions. In the real world, however, ﬁrms recruit new workers if demand is large
and dismiss workers if demand is low. In terms of the model, this implies that the underlying cost
parameters must satisfy a condition which allows for non-zero workforce adjustments. For this





Under this alterative, ﬁrms hire and ﬁre at positive rates but only if the shadow value of an extra
worker is respectively greater than H and lower than −F. More speciﬁcally, due to the positive
slope of the shadow value, the optimal policy consists of a lower (hl) and an upper threshold value
(hu) for h. These thresholds deﬁne a segment [hl,hu] such that the shadow value is lower than
adjustment costs if h is positioned in the interior while it equates adjustment costs if h lies on the
boundaries. Firing and hiring are operated when h moves respectively beyond the upper and the
lower boundary of the segment. In this case, the size of workforce interventions is the minimum
required to push working time back onto the boundaries. In fact, any further intervention aimed
at an internal point would entail an adjustment cost higher than the beneﬁt.
Since the shadow value of workforce is forward-looking, boundary interventions aﬀect the
shadow value not only near the boundaries but also in the interior of the inaction segment. For-
mally, the shadow value with positive interventions ￿ S(h) obtains from the ”free-ﬂoat” shadow value
S(h) by adding two extra terms7:
￿ S(h) = S(h) + Ahα1 + Bhα2 (16)
The two unknown coeﬃcients A and B and the two policy variables hl and hu are determined
by the well known value matching and "smooth pasting" conditions (Harrison, 1985; Krugman,
1991):
￿ S(hu) = H ￿ S(hl) = −F (17)
7Let Φ(h) represent the expectational component of the shadow value due to boundary interventions: Φ(h) ≡
￿ S(h)−S(h). Since this component does not imply any payoﬀ ﬂow, the diﬀerential equation that governs its value is
rΦ = E[dΦ]. Standard application of Ito’s lemma gives the general solution to the equation: Φ(h) = Ahα1 +Bhα2.
9￿ S￿(hu) = 0 ￿ S￿(hl) = 0 (18)
Equations 17 impose, at the boundaries, the equality between adjustment costs and the shadow
value. Equations 18 insure that the shape of ￿ S(h) is consistent with rational expectations8.
In the remainder of this section we use equations 17 and 18 to compute the optimal hiring
and ﬁring boundaries hl and hu under a set of baseline parameters. We calibrate the model on a
yearly basis, parameters are as follows: µ = 0.03, σ = 0.08, w = 1, r = 0.12, p = 0.3, F = 855,
H = 171, hs = 1710. The value assigned to yearly standard hours hs corresponds to 38 hours
per week times 45 weeks. The values assigned to parameters µ and σ imply that in normal years
output increases by 3% but it can increase by 11% in boom years and by -5% in bad years. The
values assigned to parameters w, F and H imply that ﬁring and hiring costs amount respectively
to 50% and 10% of the standard annual wage bill hsw, these represent reasonable proportions for
countries with average employment protection legislation (OECD, 1994 and 1999). Finally, the
rather large value for r is intended to capture a positive rate of risk aversion. With these baseline
values the boundaries are hl = 1639.4 and hu = 1851.3. This means that layoﬀs are operated when
undertime reaches 1.6 hours per week while hiring takes place when overtime reaches 3.2 hours per
week.
3 Worksharing
When ﬁring costs are not prohibitively large, workers face the risk of being laid oﬀ during periods of
low production. In these circumstances, however, workers can reduce the number of ﬁring and the
chance of being ﬁred by accepting a temporary reduction in the number of employment hours and
a proportional reduction in the weekly or monthly wage. In this sense, temporary (or contingent)
worksharing involves a more equitable rationing of the limited stock of full time jobs supported by
demand conditions. All individuals work for less hours instead of having some of them working
full time and some others redundant. In many European countries contingent worksharing is also
favoured by publicly administered wage-supplement schemes whereby workers are fully or partially
insured from the ensuing loss of income.9
From the point of view of the ﬁrm, contingent worksharing operates as if the statutory working
time were temporarily reduced to accommodate the slack in demand. For this purpose, in this
section we assume that the statutory working time is given by hs − δt with δt representing the
reduction in standard hours due to worksharing. Furthermore, since worksharing is in place only
8For a very transparent discussion on this point see Krugman (1991).
9In Germany the scheme is called Kurzarbeitergeld, in France Rémunération Chomage Temporarire, in Italy
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni. For details on institutional arrangements of single countries see Missoc (Mutual
Information System on Social Protection): http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_en.htm.
10Panel a: Firing costs 50% of annual wage
q hl hu Average h
0 1639.4 (36.6) 1851.3 (41.2) 1760.9 (39.13)
0.4 1599.1 (35.5) 1834.7 (40.6) 1736.4 (38.6)
0.8 1428.1 (31.7) 1787.8 (39.7) 1654.9 (36.8)
Panel b: Firing costs 100% of annual wage
q hl hu Average h
0 1600.5 (35.6) 1884.9 (41.9) 1770.4 (39.3)
0.4 1535.0 (34.1) 1859.7 (41.3) 1734.1 (38.5)
0.8 1197.8 (26.6) 1792.8 (39.8) 1620.4 (36.0)
Table 1: The impact of worksharing on the hiring and ﬁring policy. Figures represent annual hours (weekly hours
in brackets).
when the slack in demand (hs − ht) is positive and since the reduction in standard time is, in the
real world, proportional to this slack we assume that hs is given by the following expression:
δt =
￿
q(hs − ht) ht ≤ hs
0 ht ≥ hs (19)
Parameter q ∈ [0,1] measures the intensity of worksharing, if q = 0 worksharing is absent
whereas if q = 1 worksharing eliminates idle hours altogether.
Once one replaces hs with hs − δt as the new standard time the undertime cost parameter g
changes as follows:
g = − hsw(1 − q) (20)
In fact, adding an extra worker implies, in the undertime region, an increase in idle hours
given by hs minus the portion of these hours which is oﬀset by worksharing, that is qhs. As a
consequence, in the undertime region, an extra worker added to workforce involves a per-period
undertime cost corresponding to (the absolute value of) the LHS of equation 20. Clearly, a more
intense worksharing reduces (the absolute value of) g. Since worksharing is not operational in the
overtime region, the size of g turns out to be unaﬀected.
In table 1 (panel a) we report computations for hl, hu and average working time for diﬀerent
values of the worksharing parameter q while all other parameters are set at baseline values. The
average working time in the last column is computed by using the ergodic distribution of h over
the corresponding support10.
As expected, the threshold hl decreases with the extent of worksharing. Thus, according to the
original objective, worksharing makes the ﬁrm more reluctant to lay-oﬀ during a downturn in the
10From Harrison (1985): the ergodic density distribution of a (µ,σ)-geometric brownian motion h subject to





, k = 2µ/σ2, h ∈ [hl,hu].
11sense that the ﬁrm waits for a deeper slack in demand before taking any action. Less expected,
the upper threshold hu also decreases with worksharing. This means that worksharing makes ﬁrms
more willing to hire during an upturn. The intuition for this result relates to the forward looking
nature of workforce decisions. Firms hire more if they take into account that workers engage in
worksharing during future periods of low production.
More formally, one may interpret these results as a consequence of the positive impact of
worksharing on the ”free ﬂoat” shadow value of workforce:
dS(ht)
dq











The derivative makes it clear that the impact of a worksharing agreement on the shadow value
depends upon the current state of production. When current working time ht is deeply below hs
the expected value on the RHS of 21 is large since the indicator I(hτ<hs) is expected to remain
equal to one in the near future. This implies that worksharing is powerful in supporting the
value of employed workforce during bad times and, as a consequence, in discouraging layoﬀs. By
contrast, when production is sustained, the indicator I(hτ<hs) is expected to be nil in the near
future. However, as the expectation horizon moves further into the future, a positive value for the
indicator becomes a more likely occurrence. This means that the sign of the derivative remains
positive even if ht is above hs. The value of the derivative, however, might be low due to heavier
discounting. Thus, worksharing is weak in supporting the shadow value of workforce in good times
but it nevertheless puts an incentive towards more recruits.
The impact of worksharing on the willingness to hire and ﬁre translates into higher employment
levels. This can be grasped immediately from the last column of the table, which clariﬁes that
worksharing reduces the average long-term working time per individual. In turn, for a given
exogenous production ﬂow, the reduction in working time is only possible if, on average, workforce
increases.
In countries with strict employment protection, as the ones in continental Europe, ﬁring costs
are closer to the whole annual wage bill than to the half (OECD, 1994 and 1999). Thus, in panel
b we report computations for ﬁring costs equal to whs. As in Bertola and Bentolila (1990), we
observe that, for given worksharing, the increase in F moves the hl boundary downwards and
the hu boundary upward. In addition, we also observe that the enlargement of the boundaries
is more pronounced if worksharing becomes more intense. What is the source of this interaction
between worksharing and ﬁring costs? We know that with a larger F not only ﬁring but also hiring
becomes more costly due to larger expenses from reverting, in the future, a current recruitment
decision11. Thus, as F increases, the ﬁrm widens the [hl,hu] interval since it wishes to trade oﬀ a
lower rate of workforce adjustments with deeper and more prolonged unbalances on the intensive
11Indeed, this represents one of the main results in Bertola and Bentolila (1990).
12margin. From the perspective of this interpretation it is straightforward to understand the role of
worksharing. In fact, with more intense worksharing, the marginal cost from widening the [hl,hu]
interval decreases so that the ﬁrm, facing a given increase in F, expands the segment to a larger
extent.
In addition to enlarging the corridor, however, with worksharing ﬁring costs also produce a
downward shift of the latter. This can be seen from the last column of table 1 which shows that an
increase in ﬁring costs leads to a long term substitution of workers with hours which depends on
the extent of worksharing. If worksharing is absent, the reaction of the ﬁrm to an increase in ﬁring
costs leads to an increase in average working time and, as a consequence, to a reduction in the
number of workers. By contrast, the substitution operates in the opposite direction if worksharing
is in place.
Our conjecture on this result is as follows. We have seen that with higher ﬁring costs the ﬁrm
enlarges the range of inaction and that worksharing reinforces the enlargement. Due to discounting,
however, this reinforcement is not symmetric. In particular, the decrease in marginal costs from
enlarging the inaction interval is more eﬀective in the undertime than in the overtime region. It
follows that, with worksharing, the downward shift of hl due to an increase in F is more pronounced
with respect to the upward shift of hu (see table 1). This implies that the corridor, while enlarging,
also ”shifts downwards” with the obvious consequence that average working time tends to decrease.
In the theoretical literature, the employment impact of ﬁring restrictions depends on a number
of factors and, as a consequence, turns out to be inherently ambiguous. Ljungqvist (2004), for
instance, by means of a general equilibrium model with frictional unemployment shows that the
impact depends on the details of the stochastic process that drives the productivity of ﬁrms. By
contrast, Bertola (1992) emphasizes the role of discountig and of decreasing marginal returns in
partial equilibrium.
This model contributes to this line of research by introducing into the picture the hours-
worker substitutability. More speciﬁcally, the paper illustrates that hours-workers substitutability
represents a potentially though neglected determinant of the overall employment impact of ﬁring
costs. From this perspective, worksharing is relevant in that it aﬀects the terms on which hours
and workers are traded-oﬀ in the long run.
To grasp further insights on this interaction, in table 2 we compute the impact on the em-
ployment policy due to an increase in ﬁring costs and under a symmetric adaptation of statutory
hours to business conditions. In other words, table 2 reproduces computations of table 1 under the
assumption that, in contrast with real world institutions, standard working time increases with
high demand and decreases with low demand:
δt =
￿
q(hs − ht) ht ≤ hs
q(ht − hs) ht ≥ hs
13Panel a: Firing costs 50% of annual wage
q hl hu Average h
0 1639.4 (36.6) 1851.3 (41.2) 1760.9 (39.13)
0.4 1609.4 (35.8) 1882.6 (41.8) 1771.6 (39.4)
0.8 1468.0 (32.6) 1961.6 (43.6) 1795.1 (39.9)
Panel b: Firing costs 100% of annual wage
q hl hu Average h
0 1600.5 (35.6) 1884.9 (41.9) 1770.4 (39.3)
0.4 1546.8 (34.4) 1916.3 (42.6) 1777.7 (39.5)
0.8 1233.3 (27.4) 1976.8 (43.9) 1778.9 (39.5)
Table 2: The employment policy under a symmetric adaptation of standard hours.
It is clear from the table that a symmetric adaptation of standard hours to demand does
not involve any meaningful change in average working time and, as a consequence, in average
employment for given ﬁring costs. In addition, an increase in ﬁring costs widens the corridor but
leaves average working time unaﬀected for any level of q.
4 Conclusions
We have studied the eﬀects of contingent worksharing in a stochastic cost-minimisation setting
where ﬁrms are allowed to change the labour input along the extensive as well as the intensive
margin. In this context, contingent worksharing beneﬁts workers retention in bad times and
increases the number of recruits in good times. The upshot of these two eﬀects is a reduction in
the long run average working time and, as a consequence, an increase in the employment level for
given long run average production.
We have also studied the role of worksharing in determining the impact of ﬁring cost on the
optimal employment policy. First, ﬁring costs discourage workforce adjustments to an extent which
depends on worksharing. Second, worksharing reinforces the impact of ﬁring costs on the ﬁring
boundary more than that on the hiring boundary with the consequence that long run working time
decreases. Thus, worksharing bends the impact of higher ﬁring costs towards an increase in the
employment level.
From an empirical perspective, these results call for a proper account of the interaction between
employment protection and measures of worksharing incidence in unemployment regressions. To
our knowledge, this has not yet been done in the large applied macro-labour literature.
14References
- Bertola G. and Bentolila S., 1990. Firing costs and labor demand: how bad is Eurosclerosis?.
Review of Economic Studies, 57, 381-402.
- Bertola G., 1992, Labor Turnover Costs and Average Labor Demand., Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 10(4), 389-412;
- Dixit A., Pindyck R. and Sodal S., 1999. A markup interpretation of optimal investment rules.
Economic Journal, 109, 179-89.
- Galeotti M., Maccini L. J. and Schiantarelli F. (2005), Inventories, Employment and Hours,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 52, pp. 575-600;
- Hamermesh D., 1989. Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs. American Eco-
nomic Review, 74(4), 674-689.
- Hamermesh D., 1990. A general Model of Dynamic Labor Demand. NBER Working Paper
n.3356.
- Harrison J.M., 1985. Brownian motion and stochastic ﬂow systems. New York: John Wiley and
Sons.
- Hart R., 1987. Working Time and Employment. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- IRS, 1999. Worksharing in Europe. European Industrial Relations Review, vol. 300 14-20, vol.
301 13-18, vol. 303 26-32.
- Ljungqvist L. (2004), How Do Layoﬀ Costs Aﬀect Employment?, Economic Journal, 112, 829-53;
- Marchetti D. and Nucci F. (2007), Pricing Behaviour and the Response of Hours to Productivity
Shocks, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, vol 39 (7), pp.1587-1611;
- Nickell S., 1986. Dynamic Models of Labour Demand. In: Ashenfelter O., Layard R. and Card
D. (Eds.). Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol.1. Amsterdam: North Holland, 473-522.
- Nuziata L., 2003. Labour Market Institutions and the Cyclical Dynamics of Employment. Labour
Economics 10, 31-53.
- OECD, 1994. Employment Outlook 1994. Paris: OECD.
- OECD, 1999. Employment Outlook 1999. Paris: OECD.
- Krugman P., 1991. Target zones and exchange rate dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
106, 669-682.
15APPENDIX
This appendix is only intended to ease the process of refereeing.












































(note 1) = g
￿￿ ∞
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Note 1: Since P (x;h,t) is diﬀerentiable with respect to x it is also left-continuous.
Step 2: Substitute equation 5
16Equation 11
Equation 11 is intuitive and holds by deﬁnition. Nevertheless one can derive the equation from

























































































Note 1: P￿(￿ h;h,t) = 0 if t < T(￿ h)
Note 2: Factors are independent by the Strong Markov Property
Note 3: Change of variable: τ = t − T(￿ h)
Note 4: P￿
￿
￿ h;h,τ + T(￿ h)
￿
= P￿(￿ h;￿ h,τ), see below:
P￿
￿









· P￿(￿ h;y,τ)dy = P￿(￿ h;￿ h,τ)d￿ h







0 if y ￿= ￿ h
1 if y = ￿ h
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